In this paper we analyze the risk attitude of a group of heterogeneous agents and we develop a theory of comparative collective risk tolerance. In particular, we characterize how shifts in the distribution of individual levels of risk tolerance a¤ect the group's attitude towards risk. In a model with e¢ cient risk-sharing and two agents an increase in the level of risk tolerance of one or of both agents might have an ambiguous impact on the collective level of risk tolerance; the latter increases for some levels of aggregate wealth while it decreases for other levels of aggregate wealth. For more general populations we characterize the e¤ect of …rst-order like shifts (individual levels of risk tolerance more concentrated on high values) and second-order like shifts (more dispersion on individual levels of risk tolerance) on the collective level of risk tolerance. We also evaluate how shifts in the distribution of individual levels of risk tolerance impact the collective level of risk tolerance in a framework with exogenous egalitarian sharing rules. Our results permit to better characterize di¤erences in risk taking behavior between groups and individuals and among groups with di¤erent distributions of risk preferences.
Introduction
Many decisions to undertake risks are made by groups. A priori, one would expect that the theory of comparative risk aversion developed by Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) , which characterizes the proclivity of individuals to undertake risks, would easily translate into a theory of group risk taking. Consider, for instance, three individuals, A, B, and C. Suppose that C is more risk averse than B and B is more risk averse than A. Intuition strongly suggests that, when acting together, A and C would be less willing to undertake risks than A and B. Paradoxically, Mazzocco (2004) showed that such intuition is not always correct. For some levels of wealth an increase in the degree of risk aversion of the most risk averse individual in a group may decrease the collective level of risk aversion. 1 Mazzocco (2004) presented this paradoxical result through a numerical example with two individuals and isoelastic preferences. Our objective in this paper is to extend this line of inquiry by establishing precisely the conditions for this phenomenon to occur and, more generally, by evaluating how changes in the distribution of individual preferences a¤ect a group's attitudes towards risk.
To be perfectly clear, the Arrow-Pratt theory of comparative risk aversion does apply to utility functions of groups. So, for example, if a group is more risk averse than another in the Arrow-Pratt sense then this group will also require a larger risk premium to eliminate a fair risk. The interpretation of such comparative statics result, however, is clouded by the following fact. The degree of risk aversion of the group depends upon both the distribution of preferences among the agents and their optimal allocations. So a change in the distribution of preferences impacts the collective level of risk aversion through two channels. A direct one as well as an indirect one due to the fact that changes in the distribution of preferences lead, in turn, to changes in the e¢ cient allocation of wealth. Therefore, if risk is shared e¢ ciently, collective risk aversion has to be determined endogenously.
There is one special case in which the problem greatly simpli…es: given an e¢ cient allocation of wealth, if all individuals in the group have a constant and common absolute cautiousness (the derivative of the reciprocal of absolute risk aversion) -e.g. under CARA or CRRA utility functions with a common level of relative risk aversion -, the group has the same absolute cautiousness (Wilson 1968) . Comparative statics of risk aversion at the aggregate level is then not di¤erent from comparative statics at the individual level. The assumption of homogeneity in individual preferences, however, does not have empirical support (e.g. Barsky et al. 1997 ) and, in fact, defeats the purpose of Arrow-Pratt's theory of comparative risk aversion. Therefore, in this paper we tackle the problem of comparing attitudes towards risk among groups composed by individuals with heterogeneous risk preferences.
We show, in the setting of Mazzocco (2004) 's paper, that the collective level of risk tolerance is a wealth share weighted average of the individual levels of risk tolerance and increasing the risk tolerance level of one agent has two e¤ects: an increase of one of the terms of the average but a possible decrease of its relative weight in the average. As a result, there are two possible shapes for the collective risk tolerance as a function of the risk tolerance level of one of the agents: increasing curve or increasing then decreasing curve.
In fact, we establish the possibility of an even more perplexing situation: An increase in the degree of risk tolerance of both members of a couple may decrease their collective degree of risk tolerance. 2 We clearly characterize these di¤erent situations in terms of the size of the aggregate endowment relative to the endowment that corresponds to the fair e¢ cient allocation. We also characterize, for the two-agent case and for more general populations, …rst-order like shifts (individual levels of risk tolerance more concentrated on high values) that have an unambiguous impact on the collective level of risk tolerance.
Since the key aspect of our analysis is preference heterogeneity we also evaluate how more dispersion on the individual levels of risk tolerance (second-order shifts) a¤ects the collective risk preferences. We show that, for high levels of wealth (relative to the level that corresponds to the fair e¢ cient allocation), more heterogeneity tends to increase collective risk tolerance, while the opposite is true for low levels of wealth.
Finally, we extend our analysis to a framework in which all members of a group receive the same endowment (egalitarian groups). This setup is appropriate to analyze situations in which the members of a group derive utility from a public good and situations in which a private good is simultaneously consumed by many individuals. For example, many goods within a household are simultaneously consumed by all the members of a family. Within this framework, and under very general individual preferences, we establish the impact of …rst-order shifts and second-order shifts on the collective level of risk tolerance.
In addition to the work of Mazzocco (2004) , our paper is closely related to the work of Hara et al (2007) , who studied the properties of collective preferences for a given distribution of individual risk preferences. We extend their analysis by evaluating how changes in the distribution of individual preferences a¤ect the collective attitudes towards risk. In this way, our analysis also complements the work of Gollier (2001 Gollier ( , 2007 , who explored how heterogeneity in the initial endowment of wealth and how heterogeneity in beliefs a¤ect a group's attitude towards risk. At a more general level, we believe that our results may shed light into the empirical literature on 'choice shifts', which compares decisions made by groups relative to decisions made by the members of the group in situations of uncertainty (e.g. Baker et al. 2008 , Shupp and Williams 2008 , Masclet et al. 2009 ), a topic which we further discuss in the conclusion. 3 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model with e¢ -cient risk sharing and we establish a number of useful results about the e¢ cient allocations of endowments and the collective risk preferences. In Section 3 we brie ‡y evaluate the case of CARA preferences, which serves as a useful benchmark. In Section 4 we analyze the case of isoelastic heterogeneous preferences. After presenting general properties of collective preferences we evaluate shifts in the distribution of individual preferences, …rst in the case of two agents and then under more general populations. In Section 5 we evaluate collective risk preferences for the case of exogenous egalitarian sharing rules, while section 6 concludes. All the proofs are provided in the Appendix. 3 In this literature the objective is to elicit the risk attitude of groups as compared to the members of the group. Another strand of related empirical literature evaluates whether, under uncertainty, groups behave in a more consistent manner than individuals (see e.g. Bone et al. 1999 , Charness et al. 2007 ).
The model
We consider a standard static model in which a group of heterogeneous agents consume a single good. The endowment per person in the consumption good is de…ned by a random variable x on the probability space ( ; F; P ). Agents have a common belief over the probability space. In order to take into account …nite as well as in…nite sets of agents, the agent space is described by (I; ; Q), where I = [0; 1) and Q is a probability measure on I. Individuals are indexed by i 2 I and we denote by E Q the expectation with respect to Q. We consider a 'consensus'group à la Samuelson (1956) . That is, the group acts as if there was a social planner who wants to reach a Pareto e¢ cient allocation of risks and solves the following maximization program
where u i is the utility function of agent i, where x i is the consumption of agent i and where i is the weight (e.g. decision power) granted to agent i. The utility function U (x) corresponds to the highest social utility level among all possible endowment distributions across agents. Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption on the utility functions. For a given agent i and a given consumption level x, the absolute (resp. relative) risk aversion A i (x) (resp. R i (x)); the absolute (resp. relative) risk tolerance t i (x) (resp. s i (x)) are given by
Note that CARA and CRRA utility funtions clearly satisfy assumption (U). If we denote by v the function de…ned by v(x; i) = u 0 i (x); we will also make the following assumption. Assumption (LSPM) The function v is log-supermodular in (x; i) ; i.e.
Remark that the log-supermodularity of v(x; i) means that A(x; i) = A i (x) is nonincreasing in i or that agent i is less risk averse (and more risk tolerant) than agent j when i j:
We have then the following classical result Proposition 1 Under Assumption (U), there exists a family of functions
We will say that (f i ) i2[0;1] is an e¢ cient sharing rule associated with the maximization program of Eq. (1).
We recall the following well known results that relate the collective risk aversion and risk tolerance to the individual ones through the e¢ cient sharing rule.
Proposition 2 (Wilson, 1968 and Hara et al. 2007 ) Let us assume that (U) is satis…ed. Let x be a given aggregate wealth and let (f i ) i2I be the e¢ -cient sharing rules associated with the maximization program of Eq. (1). The collective absolute risk tolerance t(x) =
U 00 (x) and the collective relative risk tolerance
xU 00 (x) are given by
The relative risk tolerance s(x) of the group is then an average of the individual levels of relative risk tolerances s i (f i (x)) weighted by the optimal individual shares of consumption. Analogously, the degree of relative risk aversion of the group is an average of the individual degrees of relative risk aversion.The group is then less risk averse than the most risk averse agent and more risk averse than the least risk-averse one. In terms of the example given in the introduction this implies, in particular, that a group composed by B and C will always be less willing to undertake risks than a group composed by A and B.
It is easy to show that s 0 (x) is positive and then that the collective relative
This fact has been underlined by Hara et al. (2007, Proposition 6) . They further show (Corollary 7) that R(x) approaches the degree of relative risk aversion of the most (least) risk averse agent as x converges to zero (in…nity).
At this stage we consider very general utility functions and we may assume, without loss of generality, that all the members of the group are granted the same weight (it su¢ ces to replace the utility function u i by i u i , note that the LSPM property is not impacted by this modi…cation). In the next we consider then the equally weighted Pareto optimum. We also assume that there exists an e¢ cient fair allocation. In other words, there exists x such that (x i ) i2I ; with x i = x for all i; is e¢ cient.
The following proposition provides an analysis of how the aggregate consumption x is shared among the agents depending on the position of x relatively to the fair e¢ cient allocation x Proposition 3 Under the Assumptions (U) and (LSPM), we have the following results.
1. For x x ; the optimal allocation (x i ) i2I associated to the aggregate wealth x is such that x i x , for all i, and x i increases with i: Furthermore, if all the utility functions are DARA then t i (x i ) increases with i.
For x
x ; the optimal allocation (x i ) i2I associated to the aggregate wealth x is such that x i x , for all i, and x i decreases with i:
Although of some interest by itself, this Proposition will also play an important role in the analysis that follows.
CARA utility functions
Let us consider constant absolute risk-aversion/tolerance utility functions of the form
We have t i (x) = i and t(x) = R i dQ(i): If the agents are indexed by their absolute levels of risk tolerance we have i = i and the log-supermodularity assumption is satis…ed. We have then t(x) = E Q h~ i and the collective level of risk tolerance does not depend on the wealth allocation among the agents. It is immediate that FSD shifts on the distribution of the individual levels of risk tolerance lead to an increase of the collective level of absolute (and relative) risk tolerance. More heterogeneity, in the sense of shifts in the distribution of preferences that preserve the mean, have no e¤ect on the group's risk tolerance. These results will serve as a useful benchmark.
CRRA utility functions
Let us consider constant relative risk-aversion/tolerance utility functions of the form
where b i is the level of relative risk tolerance of individual i and 1 bi is his level of relative risk aversion. In such a setting, we have
Since the utility functions are no more de…ned up to a multiplicative constant, we do not assume anymore that the i = 1 for all i: However, we still assume that there exists a wealth level x for which the fair allocation (x i ) i2I with x i = x for all i; is e¢ cient. Note that the existence of such a fair allocation can always be granted through a judicious choice of the weights ( i ) i2I .
The …rst-order conditions for Pareto optimality give then that i (x ) and all the weights i are equal to 1. Note that with this renormalization, x = 1 corresponds to the e¢ cient fair allocation.
In the next we consider then the equally weighted Pareto optimum. Since the agents di¤er by only one characteristic, namely their level b i of relative risk tolerance, we might index them by this characteristic or we may, in other words, assume that b i = i: For a given function h; we may then write indi¤erently
The level of relative risk-aversion is then decreasing with i and the log-supermodularity condition is immediately satis…ed.
The following Proposition uses these assumptions to characterize precisely the functions de…ning collective preferences and the collective level of risk aversion.
Proposition 4
In a group made of agents with constant but heterogeneous levels of relative risk aversion, we have at the equally weighted Pareto optimum
The collective degree of relative risk aversion R(x) is given by
As seen in the proof in the Appendix, the Lagrange multiplier of the Pareto optimum problem is given by q = exp( 1 (x)) and q is then the shadow price associated to the constraint P i2I x i = x: We clearly have (0) = 1; which means that 1 (x ) = 0 and q(x ) = 1 for the e¢ cient fair allocation x = 1. Since the agents are risk averse, high levels of aggregate wealth have a low shadow price and low levels of aggregate wealth have high shadow price and we can easily derive that q(x) < 1 for x > x and q(x) > 1 for x < x . This means, in particular, that we have 1 (x) < 0 for x > 1 and 1 (x) > 0 for x < 1.
A model with two agents
Mazzocco (2004) shows that, in a model with two agents, an increase in the level of risk tolerance of one of the agents might have an ambiguous impact on the collective level of risk tolerance. It increases for some levels of aggregate wealth while it decreases for other levels of aggregate wealth. Since this is only stated on a numerical example in Mazzocco (2004) , let us clearly express this result.
Proposition 5 In a model with two agents with b 1 < b 2 ; there exists x 1 such that a small increase of b 2 leads to an increase of the collective level of risk tolerance t(x) for all x x and to a decrease of the collective level of risk tolerance t(x) for all x x:
Recall that after our normalization, x = 1 corresponds to the fair e¢ cient allocation. Proposition 5 means then that an increase of the risk tolerance level of the most risk tolerant agent increases (decreases) the collective level of risk tolerance for levels of wealth above (below) a given threshold that is below the fair e¢ cient allocation. Note that the threshold x depends on b 1 and b 2 : This means that for x above the fair allocation, any increase of b 2 increases the collective risk tolerance. In fact, above the fair allocation, an increase of b 2 also increases the weight granted to b 2 leading to an increase of the collective level of risk tolerance. For a wealth level x below the fair allocation, the impact of an increase of b 2 is less clear. Indeed, we showed in Proposition 3 that for low levels of aggregate wealth the least risk tolerant agent (the most risk averse) has a larger share of the total wealth and an increase of b 2 leads to an increase of the weight granted to b 1 (the share of total wealth of agent 1). The increase of b 2 has then two e¤ects in opposite directions: an increase of one of the terms of the average (namely the greatest one) and an increase of the weight of the smallest one. Since the second e¤ect does not exist for x = 1; the …rst e¤ect continues to dominate for x above a given threshold x 1 while the second e¤ect dominates for x x:
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the impact of an increase of b 2 :
The next Proposition analyzes more in detail how the collective level of risk tolerance evolves as a function of b 2 :
Proposition 6 In a model with two agents with b 1 < b 2 ; b 1 being given, for
In summary, for (very) low levels of wealth, increasing the risk tolerance of the more risk tolerant agent has an ambiguous impact on the collective attitude towards risk. Proposition 6 characterizes precisely the conditions for this paradoxical result to occur. Propositions 5 and 6 establish the behavior of collective preferences as a function of one of the agent's risk tolerance. Another important question is what happens to the collective level of risk tolerance when both agents become more risk tolerant. In the next Proposition we show that the ambiguous impact disappears when we consider a uniform increase of risk tolerance across the agents, but that for non-uniform increases in risk tolerance the collective degree of risk tolerance may still be lower. and increases with h for x 1 if k 1: In particular, t x (h) increases with
Let us illustrate the second point by two extreme situations. For k very small (near to 0), the shifts we are considering are almost of the form (b 1 ; b 2 ) ! (b 1 ; b 2 + ") that have already been considered in Proposition 5. These shifts increase the risk tolerance level of the second agent and also increase its weight for x 1. These shifts lead then to an unambiguous increase of the aggregate level of risk tolerance for x 1. For k near in…nity (and h very small), the shifts we are considering are almost of the form (b 1 ; b 2 ) ! (b 1 + "; b 2 ) and such shifts increase the risk tolerance level of the …rst agent and also increase its weight when x 1: These shifts lead then to an unambiguous increase of the aggregate level of risk tolerance for x 1: The proposition shows that there is a range for k for which the shifts have an unambiguous impact without restrictions on x: However, for small levels of k we cannot conclude that the collective level of risk tolerance is higher. 4 We are also interested in the impact of more heterogeneity among our 2 agents. The next result shows that more heterogeneity leads to a higher collective risk tolerance level for high wealth levels (above the fair e¢ cient allocation) and to a lower collective risk tolerance level for low wealth levels (below the fair e¢ cient allocation).
Proposition 8 Let b 1 and b 2 be given with b 1 < b 2 and let us consider a shift of the form b 1 h and b 2 + h with h > 0: The associated level of collective risk tolerance t x (h) increases (resp. decreases) with h for x 1 (for x 1):
This result is very intuitive. We have already seen that the collective level of risk tolerance is near the risk tolerance level of the most risk tolerant agent for high levels of wealth and is near the risk tolerance level of the least risk tolerant level agent for low levels of wealth. More heterogeneity leads to an increase of the risk tolerance level of the most risk tolerant agent and to a decrease of the risk tolerance level of the least risk tolerant agent. This leads then to an increase of the collective level of risk tolerance for high levels of wealth and to a decrease of the collective level of risk tolerance for low levels of wealth. Proposition 8 permits to give a precise meaning to high and low levels of wealth since the fair e¢ cient allocation appears to be the relevant threshold. Figure 8 illustrates this result.
General populations
The di¤erent results of the previous section permit to see that …rst-order stochastic dominance shifts do not guarantee an increase in the collective degree of risk tolerance. In this section we initially consider whether a stronger notion of …rst-order stochastic dominance leads to an unambiguous impact on the group's degree of risk tolerance. Then we evaluate the e¤ect of more heterogeneity within a group. In order to treat the problem in a quite general setting, we consider from now on general populations described by a distribution on I = [0; 1) : To relate the results in this more general setting to those obtained in the 2-agent framework, we will attach a speci…c attention to distributions with a 2-point support.
Since FSD is not a good candidate to obtain comparative static results, let us recall the following de…nition corresponding to a stronger notion of …rst-order dominance.
De…nition 1. Monotone Likelihood Ratio Dominance (MLR). Let P and Q denote two probability measures on I = [0; 1). We say that P dominates Q in the sense of MLR (P < M LR Q) if there exist numbers 0 1 and a nondecreasing function h :
In other words, an MLR dominated shift for a given probability measure puts less weight for higher values of i. This concept is widely used in the statistical literature and was …rst introduced in the context of portfolio problems by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) . MLR dominance is stronger than FSD and, in particular, an MLR dominated shift for a given distribution reduces the mean.
When the supports of P and Q are reduced to two points, (b In the …rst case, any average of the risk tolerance levels in the support of Q is smaller than any average of the risk tolerance levels in the support of P and the collective risk tolerance level is higher under P: The (most) interesting case is when both probability measures have the same support. We then have two populations with the same set of possible levels of individual level of risk tolerance b 1 and b 2 but with di¤erent proportions of agents in each category: a proportion p 1 (resp. p 2 = 1 p 1 ) of agents that have an individual level b 1 (resp. b 2 ) of risk tolerance under P and a proportion q 1 (resp. q 2 = 1 q 1 ) of agents that have an individual level b 1 (resp.
In summary, when the support of the population is reduced to two points, an MLR dominant shift in the degree of risk tolerance of the members of the group increases the group's risk tolerance, so such shift clearly characterizes the notion of a "more risk tolerant group". The following proposition generalizes the impact of MLR shifts for distributions with more general supports.
Proposition 10 Let us consider two populations characterized by two distributions P and Q of individual levels of risk tolerance. If P < M LR Q then for all x 1; we have t P x t Q x : However, P < M LR Q does not guarantee an increase of the collective level of risk tolerance when x > 1:
MLR provides then a satisfying answer to the impact of shifts for low levels of wealth (when x 1), which corresponds to the case where the unilateral increase of one of the individual levels of risk tolerance failed to guarantee an increase of the aggregate level of risk tolerance. In the following Proposition we show that when the density function (introduced in De…nition 1) h = dP dQ has an exponential growth rate, then we do have an unambiguous impact on collective risk tolerance.
Proposition 11 Let us consider two populations characterized by two distributions P and Q on [0; 1)of individual levels of risk tolerance such that P < M LR Q with dP dQ (b) = exp(kb) for some positive k and : For all x; we have t
We have seen in the 2-agent setting (Proposition 8) that more heterogeneity has a clear impact on the collective level of risk tolerance depending on the relative position of the aggregate wealth with respect to the fair e¢ cient allocation. We are now interested in establishing the e¤ect of "more heterogeneity" in the general setting. For this purpose, we introduce the following de…nition.
De…nition 2. Portfolio Dominance (PD). Let Q 1 and Q 2 denote two probability measures on I = [0; 1). We say that Q 1 dominates Q 2 in the sense of
This concept has been introduced in the context of portfolio problems by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) and further studied by Gollier (1997) . In the portfolio context it is related to the degree of riskiness of the asset returns. In our context, it is related to the level of individual heterogeneity in relative risk tolerance. In particular, a mean preserving PD dominated shift for a given distribution increases the variance (Jouini and Napp, 2008, Proposition 3).
The following proposition uses this concept to characterize the impact of "more heterogeneity" in the distribution of individual preferences.
Proposition 12
The intuition is, in essence, the same as that in Proposition 8. At high wealth levels those individuals that have a high tolerance for risk are more representative of the collective level of risk tolerance, but the opposite is true at low wealth levels. More dispersion in the levels of risk tolerance of the group then leads to a higher (lower) level of collective risk tolerance for high (low) wealth levels.
The case of egalitarian groups
It is interesting to analyze the aggregate behavior in a model where all the agents consume the total consumption x: This is the case when x is a public good. This also the case when x is a private good but simultaneously consumed by all the agents in the group. We may consider that both agents in a couple get utility from saving money or from holding consumption goods and consider these goods as owned by the couple and not shared among them through an e¢ cient sharing rule. This is also the setup used in a number of recent experiments that compare the degree of risk aversion of groups with that of individuals (e.g. Shupp Masclet et al. 2009 ) and where the rewards of the group are exogenously divided equally among its members. We may imagine, for example, that such experiments re ‡ect the widely observed regularity of partnerships with equal sharing rules.
In the next, the endowment in the consumption good is de…ned by a random variable x on the probability space ( ; F; P ) and the social utility function is given by
where u i is the utility function of agent i and where i is the weight granted to agent i. We have then
where P u is the probability measure de…ned by
Let us …rst analyze the case with 2 agents and CRRA functions. We have then u i (x) = 1 1
and we take i = 1; i = 1; 2; as in the previous section. Equation (6) can be rewritten as follows
and the aggregate relative risk aversion is a weighted arithmetic average of the individual levels of relative risk aversion. As in the private good case, the collective level of relative risk aversion decreases with x and it approaches the degree of relative risk aversion of the most (least) risk averse agent in the economy as x converges to zero (in…nity). Notice also that the weights are given by the individual marginal utilities and the highest weight is granted to the lowest (highest) individual level relative risk aversion for x > 1(for x < 1). An increase of the individual level of risk tolerance of the most risk tolerant agent might then have an ambiguous impact. We have the following result
Proposition 13
In a model with a public good, two agents and CRRA functions with b 1 < b 2 ; there exists x 1 such that a small increase of b 2 leads to an increase of the collective level of risk tolerance t(x) for all x x and to a decrease of the collective level of risk tolerance t(x) for all x x:
In particular, this means that FSD shifts of the individual levels of risk tolerance are not su¢ cient to increase the collective level of risk tolerance. The next result illustrates the impact of a mean preserving spread on the individual levels of risk aversion in a 2-agent setting.
Proposition 14
In a model with a public good, two agents and CRRA functions with b 1 < b 2 (or equivalently R 1 > R 2 ), a shift of the form R 1 h and R 2 + h with h > 0 increases (decreases) the aggregate level of relative risk aversion R(x) for x 1 (for x 1). It increases (decreases) the collective level of risk tolerance t(x) for x 1 (for x 1).
In the next we characterize, in a general distribution setting, the impact of MLR shifts on the collective level of risk tolerance/aversion. Note that the following result is obtained for very general utility functions.
Proposition 15
Let us consider two populations respectively characterized by distributions P 1 and P 2 on (I; ). Under Assumptions (U) and (LSPM) and if P 2 < M LR P 1 then the collective level of risk aversion (risk tolerance) under P 1 is higher (lower) than under P 2 :
The result in Proposition 15 is quite powerful. Under the assumption that the members of the group consume the same endowment, and under weak restrictions on the individual utility functions, if the individual levels of risk aversion are more concentrated on high values (in the sense of MLR dominance) then the collective level of risk aversion will be higher for all endowment levels. In this case MLR dominance provides a clear characterization of comparative collective risk aversion 5 . The next proposition analyzes the impact of more heterogeneity on the individual levels of risk aversion. For a given distribution P on (I; ) and for a given x; we denote by P x the image measure of P by i !
: The measure P x describes the distribution of the individual levels of risk aversion at a given wealth level x:
Proposition 16 Let us consider two populations respectively characterized by distributions P 1 and P 2 on (I; ) and let us assume that (U) is satis…ed. If, for a given x; u 0 i (x) is nondecreasing in i,
is decreasing with i 6 and
; then the collective level of risk aversion (risk tolerance), at x; under P 2 is higher (lower) than under P 1 :
In particular, if there exists x such that all the individual marginal utilities u 0 i (x ) are equal, then u 0 i (x) is nondecreasing in i for x x : It su¢ ces then to have that
is decreasing with i and P x 2 < P D P x 1 to conclude that the aggregate level of risk aversion, at x; under P 2 is higher than under P 1 : In other words, under weak assumptions on the utility function, less heterogeneity in risk aversion, in the sense of PD dominance, implies a higher level of collective risk aversion when wealth is su¢ ciently low.
Conclusion
Mazzocco (2004) established the counter-intuitive result that an increase in the level of risk tolerance of one of the individuals in a couple may reduce their collective degree of risk tolerance. We studied precisely the conditions for this phenomenon to occur. More generally, we established conditions under which groups with individual levels of risk tolerance more concentrated on high values and groups that are more heterogeneous will display higher risk tolerance, both with e¢ cient risk-sharing and with an exogenous egalitarian sharing rule. Our results permit to better characterize di¤erences in risk taking behavior between groups and individuals and among groups with di¤erent distributions of risk preferences.
It should be possible to design experiments to evaluate if our results are consistent with elicited risk attitudes of groups and individuals. Shupp and Williams (2008) compare the willingness to pay for lotteries of small groups and individuals in a setup similar to that of Section 5. They conclude that, for most lotteries, group choices are signi…cantly di¤erent from the mean of 5 Note that Proposition 15 can easily be extended for higher order collective preferences towards risk. For example, if we assume that u 00 (x; i) is LSPM in (x; i), then an MLR dominant shift decreases the collective degree of absolute (and relative) prudence. 6 Note that this last condition is just a little bit stronger than the LSPM condition.
the individual choices (groups tend to be more risk averse than individuals for low-expected-value lotteries but less risk averse than individuals for highexpected-value lotteries). These results are consistent with a large number of studies in social psychology that show "risky" and "cautious" shifts in group risk-taking behavior relative to the mean of the individual choices (see e.g. Clark 1971 ). We have seen that there is no reason to believe that the group's willingness to pay (derived from the collective preferences), and more generally the willingness to take risks, should be the same as the mean of the individual members'willingness to pay. In particular, even with CRRA individual preferences, the fact that the group's relative risk aversion decreases with x implies that "cautious" shifts should be more prevalent in low-expected-value (low-stakes) lotteries while "risky" shifts should be more prevalent in high-expected-value (high-stakes) lotteries, precisely what Shupp and Williams (2008) found. 7 It would be interesting to further explore the experimental relevance of our results by proceeding to inter-groups comparisons. For instance, to analyze the di¤er-ence in risk attitudes between two couples that only di¤er by the risk aversion level of one of the members, e.g. the man.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us denote by ' the function de…ned by
)dQ(i): By Inada's conditions and since u i is increasing and strictly concave for all i, ' is well de…ned on (0; 1) and decreasing. Furthermore, from the monotone convergence Theorem we have lim x!0 '(q) = 1 and lim x!1 '(q) = d: Let us then de…ne
for all i and is independent of i: The family (f i (x)) sati…es then the …rst-order conditions of the maximization program de…ned by Eq. (1) and since this program is concave we have
Proof of Proposition 3. Since the fair allocation x i = x ; i 2 I; is e¢ cient and since we granted the same weight to all the agents, the …rst-order conditions for Pareto optimality give us that u decreases with i: The same kind of arguments as above give that x i decreases with i: Proof of Proposition 4. The …rst-order condition gives us the optimal allocation of agent i; x i = q bi , where q is the Lagrange multiplier. Using the resource constraint we obtain 
where a x (b 2 ) is the solution of
We get after computations
The aggregate level of risk tolerance is an increasing function of b 2 :
Let us now focus on the case x 1: It is easy to check that a x (b 2 ) is always positive for x 2 (0; 1) and decreases with x from 1 to 0: It is also easy to see that '(a; b 1 ; b 2 ) is decreasing in a; positive for a = 0 and converges to 1 when a converges to 1: There exists then a level x < 1 such that
Proof of Proposition 6. We have
We have already seen that '(a;
It is immediate that for
It su¢ ces to show that a x (b 2 ) and a(b 1 ; b 2 ) cross only once to establish the result. Let us consider b 2 such that a x (b 2 ) = a(b 1 ; b 2 ) and let us compute
we have a(b 1 ; b 2 ) = a x (b 2 ) and we denote it by a : Direct computations give
:
By de…nition, we have '(a ;
We have then that : The limits of t x derive from there. Proof of Proposition 7. It su¢ ces to prove directly the second point. We have
where a x (h) is the solution of (a x (h);
where
For x 1; we have a x (0) 0 and it su¢ ces to impose k Proof of Proposition 8. We have
where a x (h) is the solution of (a x (h); b 1 h; b 2 + h) = x: We want to show that for x < 1; we have dtx dh (0) < 0 and for x > 1 we have
We have
b1 exp( ab1)+b2 exp( ab2) where a = a x (0); and
which is of the same sign as g(a) with
which has the same sign as `(a) with
We have lim a!1`( a) = 1,`(0) = 0 and lim a! 1`( a) = 1: We also havè
The function`is then negative on R and positive on R + : Since a > 0 for x < 1 and a < 0 for x > 1 this gives the result. Proof of Proposition 9. We denote by t P x (resp. t Q x ) the aggregate level of risk tolerance in the …rst (resp. second) population when the aggregate wealth is x: We have t
We have similar formulas for t Q x and we have that t P x t Q x if and only Proof of Proposition 10. We …rst prove that for x 1 an MLR shift is su…-cient to increase the aggregate level of risk tolerance. Suppose that P < M LR Q: Since the MLR order is stronger than the FSD order, we have for all nondecreasing function h; E
; hence Q (t) P (t) for t 0: Since Q and P are decreasing, then for all x 1,
, we obtain that 1 and t(x) = 1 (a+1) 2 = x 2 : After the shift, the aggregate level of risk tolerance is given by
where a " solves
We have then
: Let us consider the di¤erence t " (x) t(x). It is positively proportional to 
The resulting shift leads then to a decrease of the collective level of risk tolerance at x: Proof of Proposition 11. We just have to consider the case where x 1: We have
To conclude, it is su¢ cient to show that k + (
< x and since
Proof of Proposition 12. Assume that P and Q are symmetric with respect to some b with dQ dP nonincreasing before b and nondecreasing after b then P < P D Q and P < SSD Q ( Jouini-Napp, 2008). Let us denote by P and Q the functions respectively de…ned by P (t) = R e bt dP (b) and Q (t) = R e bt dQ(b). Since e bt is decreasing and convex for t 0, we have by SSD, Q (t) P (t) for all t 0. For x 1; 
: Let us consider Q 1 de…ned
: We have
: We have then the result for x 1: For x 1; since both distributions are symmetric with respect to b ; we have
= 2b
and
: Since There exists then x < 1 such that @t @h (x; 0) < 0 for x < x and @t @h (x; 0) > 0 for x > x : Proof of Proposition 14. Let us denote by R(x; h) the aggregate level of risk aversion at x when the individual levels of risk aversion are given by R 1 h and R 2 + h, we have R(x; h) = (R1 h) exp( ln x(R1 h))+(R2+h) exp( ln x(R2+h)) exp( ln x(R1 h))+exp( ln x(R2+h)) and @R @h (x; 0) = e 2 ln xR 1 e 2 ln xR 2 +2 ln x(R2 R1)e ln xR 1 e ln xR 2 (e ln xR 1 +e ln xR 2 ) 2 which is clearly negative for x > 1 and positive for x < 1. Proof of Proposition 15. Let us denote by U (x; 1) and U (x; 2) the social utility functions respectively associated to P 1 and P 2 : We denote respectively by F (i; 1) and F (i; 2) the cumulative distributions of P 1 and P 2 : We have U 0 (x; j) = Z @u @x (x; i)F 0 (i; j)di; j = 1; 2:
By assumption, @u @x (x; i) is log-supermodular. Furthermore, since P 2 < M LR P 1 ; F 0 (i; j) is also LSPM. By Karlin's Theorem U 0 (x; j) is log-supermodular.
Therefore, @ ln U 0 (x;j) @x increases with j or in other words 
